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Physical Pictures: 
Engineering Models circa 1914 and in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus   
by Susan G. Sterrett, 
Department of Philosophy, Duke University
Today1  I’m going to talk about an element in the milieu in which Wittgenstein 
conceived the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that has not been recognized to date:  
the formalization of the methodology of experimental scale models that occurred just 
about the time he was writing that early work.  
Lest this seem too far-fetched or peripheral to warrant spending the good part of an 
afternoon on, let me provide some setting.  
Wittgenstein remarked to a number of people that he got the main idea for the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus upon reading an account of the use of a physical 
scale model with dolls and model automobiles and busses in a courtroom case about 
an traffic accident.  He had, he said, been serving in the Austrian army at the Front in 
the Fall of 1914 at the beginning of World War I when he read a newspaper account of 
the court trial, and, upon reflecting upon the use of the dolls and model automobiles,  
suddenly  realized that a proposition is a picture.  After Wittgenstein’s death, his friend 
von Wright wrote a memoir about him, in which he mentions the importance 
Wittgenstein put on reading about the use of a scale model.  von Wright also suggests, 
in a footnote, that “it would be interesting to know whether Wittgenstein’s conception of 
the proposition as a picture is connected in any way with the Introduction to Heinrich 
Hertz’s Die Prinzipien der Mechanik”, remarking that Wittgenstein held the book in 
high esteem.  
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  [ A shorter talk of the same title was given in Vienna on  July 6,  2000 at  HOPOS  (History of Philosophy 
of Science Conference ) 2000.  The HOPOS 2000 version has since been published in History of 
Philosophy of Science:  New Trends and Directions ,  Michael Heidelberger and Friedrich Stadler  (Eds.)  
Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer 2002 (Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 9/2001), pp. 121-135.]
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In an attempt to understand what Wittgenstein meant in saying a proposition is a 
picture, some people have gone off and running with von Wright’s suggestion, which 
has led to some lopsided readings of the portions of the Tractatus that speak of a 
proposition as a picture or a model -- amazingly, the reading that often arises is that 
Wittgenstein meant here to be referring to abstract mathematical models, or to abstract 
mental models.  Others, uninformed by the knowledge of what’s involved in building a 
scale model, or of the fact that aeronautical engineering research at the time would 
have involved learning in practice how to construct and use scale models, have 
employed naive accounts of scale models in their attempts to render the remarks in the 
Tractatus intelligible. 
Today, I’ll explain the methodology of scale models, and explain why I find it helpful to 
keep in mind how this kind of model portrays when reading the Tractatus [abbreviated 
below as TLP]  --  in particular, when reading the statements about pictures and 
models, such as: 
 
- A picture is a fact  [TLP 2.141], 
- A picture is a model of reality [TLP 2.12], 
- The "pictorial relationship" that makes a picture a picture 
is part of that picture  [TLP 2.1.5.3] , and 
- A picture must have its pictorial form in common with 
reality in order to able to depict it  [TLP 2.17].  
And, when reading the sections in the Tractatus about objects and states of affairs, or 
atomic facts, such as: 
- The statement that the form of an object is the possibility of its 
occurring in states of affairs, or atomic facts [2.0141];  
- that in a state of affairs, or atomic fact, objects fit into one 
another like links of a chain [2.03], and 
- that if all the objects are given, then all possible states of 
affairs, or atomic facts, are also given [TLP 2.0124].  
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So, although I’ll be telling a historical story today, the purpose is to get clear on the 
sometimes puzzling and obscure passages on pictures and models.  
What I’ll propose today is something that isn’t found in the philosophical literature at 
all:  that 1914 was a threshold year for the methodology of experimental scale models, 
in that a formal basis for the practice was announced and became well known in 
London just months before the crucial moment of insight Wittgenstein had in the Fall of 
1914 when he read a newspaper account about the use of scale models in a Paris 
courtroom and suddenly thought that he had the key to the answer to all his problems 
about propositions.  I’ll explain the advance in the formal basis for the methodology of 
scale modelling, and then I’ll show why I think the statements in the Tractatus about 
pictures, objects, atomic propositions, and states of affairs, as well as his unusual view 
that there are no logical constants in the general form of a proposition all fall into place 
once we understand the view that a proposition is a picture or a model along the lines 
of the mathematical basis for the construction and use of scale models. 
[The timeline included as page 2 of the handout given out at the talk is shown on page 
22 of this paper; it is a two-column chart entitled “Wittgenstein and Physical Similarity”]
Propositions as Pictures 
To refresh your memory, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was written early in 
Wittgenstein’s career.  He had studied engineering in Berlin, then gone to Manchester, 
England to do graduate research work in aeronautical engineering.  While there, he 
studied mathematics as well, and, upon being told that Bertrand Russell was the 
person to study foundations of mathematics with, and/or after reading Russell’s 
Principles of Mathematics, he left his position as a graduate research student in 
aeronautical engineering in Manchester to study philosophy with Bertrand Russell at 
the University of Cambridge.  (It should be noted that both the legendary engineering 
professor at Manchester, Osborne Reynolds,  and Horace Lamb, a mathematics 
professor at Manchester who wrote the classic engineering text, Hydrodynamics,  as 
well as texts on mechanics and dynamics, both got their degrees in mathematics at 
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Cambridge.  Thus there is not as great a gulf between engineering at Manchester and 
study in foundations of mathematics at Cambridge as one might suppose.)  In various 
letters, Russell refers to Wittgenstein as a would-be “aeronautical engineer” -- it seems 
Wittgenstein still thought of himself as an engineer,  and considered whether it was 
worth leaving that career path behind in order to study philosophy.   Or, at least he 
sometimes gave Russell that impression.  In  1913 - 1914, he spends time secluded in 
Norway, trying to solve the problems of logic.  He produces what we now call “Notes 
on Logic” in 1913 and gets G. E. Moore to visit him there in early 1914, producing a 
manuscript we now refer to as “Notes dictated to G. E. Moore in April of 1914”  during 
the visit.  In the summer of 1914, he volunteers to serve in the Austrian army, and 
begins duty that Fall. 
We have the Notebooks he kept in his rucksack, in which he wrote almost daily.  The 
incident that Wittgenstein said prompted him to think about a proposition as a picture 
occurred during the first few months of military service, in the fall of 1914,  and is 
recorded in a diary entry.  He wrote: 
 "In a proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally.  (As when in 
the law-court in Paris a motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls, 
etc.)"  [Wittgenstein 1979, p. 7e]
 That insight,  that in a proposition a world is put together experimentally, occurs in the 
context of considering the most general concept of the proposition, and of co-
ordination between proposition and situation;  an earlier entry on the very same day 
reads thus:  
"The general concept of the proposition carries with it a quite general concept of 
the co-ordination of proposition and situation:  The solution to all my questions 
must be extremely simple."   [Wittgenstein 1979, p. 7e]
His diary indicates that he thinks his insight about a world being put together 
experimentally does hold the solution to all his questions, for he then notes:  
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"This must yield the nature of truth straight away (if I were not blind)." 
 [Wittgenstein 1979, p. 7e]
The comment to friends that  reading the newspaper account about how dolls were 
used to represent a motor-car accident in a law-court was pivotal in coming to think 
that propositions represent by being pictures really does appear accurate:  with one 
exception, there is no mention of pictures in previous entries in the Notebooks, in any 
of the manuscripts entitled Notes on Logic (1913) nor in the “Notes dictated to Moore 
in Norway” in April of 1914.  But, there is an abundance of entries on the proposition 
as picture in writings after that.  And, the question of how a picture portrays is salient 
throughout his subsequent writings, although that question undergoes shifts in 
emphasis as time goes on.
  
Wittgenstein's biographer, Brian McGuinness, has remarked that this particular 
development in Wittgenstein's thinking  (i.e., that a proposition is a picture or model)  is 
probably not as crucial as it is often taken to be.  [McGuinness, 1974, p. 57].  I think he 
has a point, in that, although this entry in September of 1914 marks the advent of the 
discussion of pictures, some of the features of the account in the Tractatus of what 
picturing is already appeared in earlier notes, though they are not explicitly formulated 
in terms of picturing.  For example, in the Notes on Logic:  "Propositions . . .  are 
themselves facts:  that this inkpot is on this table may express that I sit on this chair," 
and (Summary) "that a certain thing is the case in the symbol says that a certain thing 
is the case in the world."   That these ideas appear in his writings over a year before he 
made  the notebook entry about the dolls in the law court indicates that the idea of a 
proposition as a picture may be a way to put certain thoughts he had already been 
formulating, rather than marking a totally unprecedented turn of thought. 
Mental Models and Experimental Models
That Wittgenstein  specifically mentions  "experimentally" ("probeweise") in the key 
diary entry  (“ that in a proposition a world is put together experimentally”) is more 
significant than might at first be obvious.  For,  when we look at what Boltzmann had to 
say about experimental models, we see Wittgenstein has put a surprising twist on 
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things.  Recall that Boltzmann appears first on the list of those whose work 
Wittgenstein said:  "I have only seized on it immediately with a passionate urge for the 
work of clarification." [McGuinness 1988, p. 84] .  In an essay on models, Boltzmann  
explicitly described experimental models as of a different sort than the kind with which 
he was comparing mental models.  Boltzmann explains why they must be 
distinguished: 
A distinction must be observed between the models which have 
been described and those experimental models which present on 
a small scale a machine that is subsequently to be completed on a 
larger, so as to afford a trial of its capabilities.  Here it must be 
noted that a mere alteration in dimensions is often sufficient to 
cause a material alteration in the action, since the various 
capabilities depend in various ways on the linear dimensions.  
Thus the weight varies as the cube of the linear dimensions, the 
surface of any single part and the phenomena that depend on 
such surfaces are proportionate to the square, while other effects --
- such as friction, expansion and condition of heat, &c., vary 
according to other laws.  Hence a flying-machine, which when 
made on a small scale is able to support its own weight, loses its 
power when its dimensions are increased. The theory, initiated by 
Sir Isaac Newton, of the dependence of various effects on the 
linear dimensions, is treated in the article UNITS, DIMENSIONS 
OF."  [Boltzmann 1974, p. 220] 
Thus, for Boltzmann’s account of mental models, the experimental models represent a 
challenge to the account:  the relationship between model and what is modelled is not 
like the relationship between a mental model and what is modelled by it. This puzzled 
me for awhile, for it's clear that Boltzmann realizes that there is a reliable methodology 
involved in experimental models.  Why  does he leave the topic in such an unresolved 
state, then?   I found an answer to this in his correspondence; it turns out  that the 
piece really was unfinished:  when the Encyclopedia Brittanica  article was 
commissioned,  Boltzmann tried to beg off on it, asking that it be assigned to someone 
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else if possible.  He protested that  "what I write about technical and machine models 
will not be complete and will have to be enlarged by an English technician." [Letter #3, 
January 7, 1900 in Blackmore 1975,  p. 57 - 58.]   When transmitting it, he says that he 
is sending it only because he has promised to do so, but that he is not at all pleased 
with it.  [Letter #5 in Blackmore 1975, p. 58]   It is unlikely that Wittgenstein, who is 
reported to have made scale models of a sewing machine [McGuinness 1988 ] and 
airplanes [Engelmann 1968 ] in his youth, would not have noticed the glaring 
difference between mental models and experimental scale models to  which 
Boltzmann is drawing attention.  Thus, what was striking about the use of physical 
models in a courtroom does not fit tidily with the notion of model found in Boltzmann.  
It does, however, exactly fit the notion of experimental scale model.   The striking thing 
about it was that it suggested that the notion of an experimental model might explain 
how a proposition can portray; on this notion of  model, if a proposition is a model of 
reality it does reach right out to reality.  
That is, the model does not exist in a mental or nonphysical realm somewhere, and the 
representing relation is no unexplained bridge between a mental or nonphysical realm 
and a physical realm.  The model is, as propositional signs are, physical, and it is 
connected with what it represents in virtue of being in the same law-governed physical 
world.  The methodology of experimental models explains, in a straightforward way 
based upon the extremely general logical principle that the units in a complete 
equation must be homogeneous, how we can read what’s happening in one piece of 
the world off another.  One can use the experimental model to predict the value of a 
quantity in one situation (reality) from an experimental model constructed in such a 
way as to have the same dimensionless ratios as that situation, but often what 
experimental models are used for is to determine whether some qualitative behavior 
obtains or not.   One example of this is one of the most famous examples of the use of 
the principle of similarity:  the work on turbulence done at Manchester by Osborne 
Reynolds in 1883 (this would have been a few years before Wittgenstein was born).  
I’ve given you a handout  pertaining to this, from Reynolds’s scientific paper [ p. 3 of 
the handout is an excerpt from Reynolds 1883 reproduced in Osborne Reynolds 
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Centenary Symposium (1968), p. 84 ]:  See the sketch of a man standing behind an 
experimental apparatus?  Here’s what’s going on:  the problem of when flow would 
become turbulent, rather than flow in smooth layers, was an important and 
mathematically intractable problem.  What Reynolds showed was that the 
phenomenon of turbulent flow depended upon a dimensionless ratio, rather than on 
the value of some dimensioned quantity, such as velocity.  What the picture shows is 
an apparatus wherein we can see the onset of turbulence:  he has a bit of red dye put 
in as the flow enters the pipe, and if the flow is in smooth layers, or laminar flow, then 
we see a horizontal red stripe or stripes.  Once the flow becomes turbulent, we see the 
red stripes becomes curls that turn upon themselves and the red dye gets distributed 
throughout the flow in an unpredictable chaotic pattern.  Now look at what Reynolds 
says in the paper:  “The results of this investigation have both a practical and a 
philosophical aspect.” (at top of box (a)); then at bottom of (a):  “The results as viewed 
in their philosophical aspect were the primary object of the investigation.”  Here’s what 
Stokes said of the work in the speech he gave on the occasion of Reynolds’s being 
awarded the Royal Medal in 1888 (less than a year before Wittgenstein was born): 
   In an important paper published in the Philosophical Transactions for 1883, 
he has given an account of an investigation, both theoretical and experimental, 
of the circumstances which determine whether the motion of water shall be 
direct or sinuous, or, in other words, regular and stable, or else eddying and 
unstable.  The dimensions of the terms in the equations of motion of a fluid 
when viscosity is taken into account involve, as had been pointed out, the 
conditions of dynamical similarity in geometrically similar systems in which the 
motion is regular; but when the motion becomes eddying it seemed no longer to 
be amenable to mathematical treatment.  But Professor Reynolds has shown 
that the same conditions of similarity hold good, as to the average effect, even 
when the motion is of the eddying kind; and moreover that if in one system the 
motion is on the border between steady and eddying, in another system it will 
also be on the border, provided the system satisfies the above conditions of 
dynamical as well as geometrical similarity.  This is a matter of great practical 
importance, because the resistance to the flow of water in channels and 
conduits usually depends mainly on the formation of eddies; and though we 
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cannot determine mathematically the actual resistance, yet the application of 
the above proposition leads to a formula for the flow, in which there is a most 
material reduction in the number of constants for the determination o f which we 
are obliged to have recourse to experiment."  [p. 80 in Jack Allen’s paper in 
Osborne Reynolds Centenary Symposium (1968)] 
I think the emphasis others have put on Boltzmann’s and Hertz’s discussions of 
models [e.g., Griffin 1964; Barker 1980]   is not well placed -- a more fitting place to 
look is towards such experimental scale models.  I actually have a section examining 
the burgeoning literature claiming the so-called “picture theory” in the Tractatus is a 
development of a one-page section on dynamical models in Hertz’s Principles of 
Mechanics. [Hertz 1956 (1895)]  Basically, I show that the idea they find in Hertz -- 
dynamical similarity -- is an important one, but it is a ubiquitous idea found in any 
eighteenth century mechanics text of the time, that every single point they try to draw 
out of it can be found in any basic text on mechanics, and that physical similarity is a 
more general case of dynamical similarity.  I’ve left that section out so as not to overrun 
the time in this talk, but I can explain this afterwards should anyone be interested.  I’m 
more interested today in explaining the strong reasons for looking to engineering 
models than in explaining how weak in comparison the reasons to look to Hertz’s 
page-long discussion of dynamical models are.   Once one takes a look instead at 
what’s happening with engineering experimental models, what one finds is that not 
only is this kind of model more fitting, but that it is just at this point in time when 
Wittgenstein has the thought to think of propositions as models in which a world is put 
together experimentally that there is a major event in the formalization of the 
methodology.
The generalization and formalization of the methodology of experimental scale 
modelling I am referring to was presented in London in 1914 just several months 
before the incident that Wittgenstein said prompted him to think of a proposition as a 
picture, but he would certainly have encountered specific applications of the 
methodology in the experimental work he had done prior to studying logic with 
Bertrand Russell.  
9
This formalization of the method of experimental scale modelling, which is based upon 
a dimensional analysis of the quantities involved in the equations, showed how the 
most general form of a physical equation arises, not from the algebraic form of the 
equation, but from the characters (that is, the kinds) of the physical quantities involved 
in the equation.   Let me repeat that, since it's crucial:  the most general form of a 
physical equation arises,  not from its algebraic form, but from the kinds,  
or types, of the physical quantities involved in the equation.   It's the kinds, 
as well as the number, of the physical quantities involved in the equation -- by physical 
quantities I mean quantities such as velocity, density, temperature, viscosity, surface 
area;  actually, there is no restriction on the kind of quantities that can be considered, 
that's what makes the method completely general --- it's the kinds, as well as the 
number,  of physical quantities involved in the equation that determine how these 
quantities can be combined to form different dimensionless parameters that together 
determine the behavior of the physical situation.  Perhaps some examples will help:  
On your handout, I have shown two examples of dimensionless ratios:  [Mach number, 
which is the velocity divided by the celerity, and which has dimensions of  L1T-1 L-1 
T1 = [1].   Reynolds number, which is (density)(velocity)(length)/(viscosity) and which 
has dimensions of   M1L-3L1T-1L1M-1L1T1 = [1]    where M stands for the dimension 
of mass, L for the dimension of length, and T for the dimension of time. ] 
Once the values of all the dimensionless parameters are determined, so is the 
behavior of the physical system (behavior of course is behavior with respect to some 
phenomenon of interest).  Often it is possible to build a scale model of a physical 
system, such that the two systems have the same values of the dimensionless 
parameters that characterize a certain kind of behavior of the system. Then, it is 
possible to set up correspondences between the quantities in the two systems, so that 
you can read what would happen in the system being modelled off the scale model, 
using what are called modelling laws:  the modelling laws tell you how to transform the 
quantity in the scale model into the value in the system being modelled.  The scale 
model by itself really tells you nothing, without knowledge of these modelling laws.  
These tell you the corresponding time in the target situation corresponding to the time 
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intervals in the situation you are regarding as a model:  so, for instance, a time period 
of a week in a riverbed model might correspond to three months in the actual riverbed 
it was designed to be a model of. 
The generalization of the methodology presented in 1914 proceeded by way of 
considering "The Most General Form of Physical Equations" and showed that, if you 
know all the quantities that are involved in the physical equation, and you know the 
kind of quantity each is, that's all you need to know in order to do all of the following:  
(i)  figure out the minimum number of dimensionless parameters that 
characterize the behavior of the system, 
(ii)  actually construct the combinations of these quantities into the required 
mutually independent dimensionless parameters.  [e.g.,  Mach number, 
Reynolds number, and Froude number.  As I’ve shown on the handout, you can 
see the quantities fit together to form a quantity in which all the dimensions 
"cancel" so to speak; this is indicated by a dimension of “1”, which is what you 
get for any quantity raised to the exponent of zero.] 
(iii)  figure out the correspondences between quantities in physically similar 
systems, that is, get the "modelling laws"  (“modelling laws” is the technical 
term, but it is not the best term -- in the Tractatus, I think these show up in the 
representing relation that makes a picture a picture) used to co-ordinate values 
of quantities between the two systems.  An example here would be the 
corresponding elapsed times in the thing modelled and the model, or 
corresponding velocities.  
Now, if this seems pretty astounding . . . well, it is. 
Buckingham showed how to do all these things in the paper in which he presented 
what he called "the pi-theorem" in April of 1914 in London.  He was systematizing 
things that had already been proven, putting things that were already in use in special 
cases into a more general form, and trying to explain their significance.  He remarked:  
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"While this theorem appears rather noncommittal, it is in fact a powerful tool and 
comparable . . . to the methods of thermodynamics or Lagrange's method of 
generalized coordinates."  
He presented the "pi-theorem" the following year in the United States in a paper to an 
Engineering Society, under the title:  “Model Experiments and the Form of Empirical 
Equations”   one of the commentators remarked: 
. . . the pi-theorem is closely analogous to thermodynamics and the 
phase rule.  Thermodynamics affords certain rigid connecting links 
between seemingly isolated experimental results, while the phase 
rule tells us the number of degrees of freedom of a chemical 
system.  The pi-theorem likewise affords rigid connecting links    . . . 
just as the phase rule tells us [ the number of degrees of freedom in 
a chemical system] , so also the pi-theorem tells us [ the number of 
degrees of freedom in a physical system] 
 . . The kernel of the paper is a theorem which is merely a 
restatement of the requirements of dimensional homogeneity, 
announced by Fourier nearly a hundred years ago, and 
extensively used by Rayleigh and others.  But [. . .] Gibbs' phase 
rule, too was new only in form, not in substance, yet it served as the 
crystallizing influence which caused an immense number of latent 
ideas to fall into line, and we may expect the pi-theorem to play a 
similar role.  
     This inevitable development of technical physics into a unified 
branch of science . . . , can be facilitated if writers on the problems 
of hydro- and aerodynamics, heat transmission and the like will be 
as introspective as possible, explicitly calling attention not only to 
their results, but to their methods of reasoning as well.  For in every 
successful artifice of reasoning , there must be some element 
which is universal and capable of being generalized . . .  
[Buckingham 1915, p. 292 ] 
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The actual statement of the "pi-theorem" in the paper presented in London in early 
1914 is as follows :  
. . . any equation which describes completely a relation subsisting 
among a number of physical quantities of an equal or smaller 
number of different kinds, is reducible to the form 
             ψ( π1, π2, π3, π4,  etc. ) = 0
in which the π's are all the independent dimensionless products of 
the form Q1x, Q2y, . . ., etc. that can be made by using the symbols 
of all the quantities Q."  [Buckingham 1914,  p. 376  ]
Notice that in this "most general form of a physical equation", there are no algebraic  
constants, i.e., no plus or minus signs, no function signs, or signs for derivatives, 
integrals, or any functional operators --there are no signs for any mathematical 
relations.  ( As Buckingham explains, the exponents of the Q's are just shorthand and 
they indicate repeated operations, i.e., el superscript 2 just means you perform the 
operation of taking some length or other twice.  It doesn’t indicate the square of a 
quantity, or repeated multiplication or even iteration of the same operation.)
[[See §3  “Illustration”  of Buckingham 1914 (p. 348-350)  (provided on talk handout) ]
Would Wittgenstein have known of this specific paper?  It's hard to say what he would 
have heard of between the time he spent isolated in Norway in 1913 and entering the 
military in 1914.  Rayleigh had been writing about a less formalized version of the 
method of physical similarity for a over a decade; he wrote about Manchester 
engineering professor Osborne Reynolds' remarkable successes using the principle of 
"dynamic similarity" in hydrodynamics and he explained the method of dimensional 
analysis used to establish it.  
But, the main ideas behind the methods of physical similarity, even if they were taking 
a generalized form in England only that year, may have already been around in 
Germany during the time Wittgenstein studied there. For one thing, one of Helmholtz’s 
scientific papers over a decade before Reynolds’s striking work with turbulence, 
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though ostensibly a practical paper about similar motions and the steering of air 
balloons, basically provides all the mathematical basis for the principles of dynamical 
similarity required for aerodynamics.  Helmholtz says, basically, well, we’ve got the 
governing differential equations, but we know we can’t solve them.  Yet, he says, there 
is a way we can use them to tell us how to use observations from one case to inform us 
about an unobserved case.  He proceeds to derive the dimensionless parameters that 
must be kept the same between the observed and the unobserved case in order that 
the two cases will have “similar motions”; and the reasoning he uses is dimensional 
analysis, that is, he looks only at the dimensions of the quantities involved.  Then he 
says, if you construct a situation you can observe in such a way that these 
dimensionless parameters hold, you will get motions that are similar to those of the 
situation you are interested in.  This paper by Helmholtz on steering air balloons was 
published in the 1873 in Berlin. 
Another reason I say that the basic ideas may have been known in Germany at the 
time Wittgenstein took an engineering course of study there is that another 
commentator at Buckingham's 1915 presentation in the United States remarked that 
Buckingham  " has struck the keynote of a new development of technical physics. . . 
The importance of technical physics, as a branch of subject matter, is already so 
clearly recognized in Germany that laboratories are being established devoted 
exclusively to this field." [Buckingham 1915]
Thus, although it is very hard to say just how much of this, and in what form, was 
around in Wittgenstein's milieu at various stages in his career, I think it is fair -- actually 
quite a modest claim --  to say that the practice of dimensional analysis, and of efforts 
to formalize it and generalize it, were part of the milieu of anyone studying aeronautics 
in the years just prior to 1914.  And that is what Wittgenstein was doing then.  
Manchester was famous for Osborne Reynolds’s work in lending sophistication and 
respectability to the practice of scale modelling, and his striking and famous work on 
the onset of turbulence was done at Manchester.  One of the earliest and most famous 
applications of physical similarity and scale modelling was the screw propeller, and 
Wittgenstein was working on propellers.  Another is the flow of jets through orifices, 
which Wittgenstein was working on in a laboratory.  
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That he was reading Russell's Principles of Mathematics  at the same time might have 
made him especially sensitive to the fact that the basis for similarity to be found in 
dimensional methods was not yet completely formalized, and heightened his interest 
in the consequences that could be drawn paying attention only to the kind, or type of 
physical quantities involved in an empirical equation.  Here is an excerpt from a letter 
Wittgenstein wrote to Russell in early 1913: 
"What I am most certain of is  . . . the fact that all theory of types must be done 
away with by a theory of symbolism showing that what seem to be different 
kinds of things are symbolized by different kinds of symbols which cannot 
possibly be substituted in one another's places.  . . . Propositions which I 
formerly wrote e2(a, R, b) I now write R(a, b) . . .”    [Letter to Russell #9 dated 
January 1913 in Wittgenstein (1974)] 
And we know that it was subsequent to Wittgenstein’s conviction quoted above  ( that 
Russell’s approach to a theory of types was not the way to go, that he was looking for 
“a theory of symbolism showing that what seem to be different kinds of things are 
symbolized by different kinds of symbols which cannot possibly be substituted in one 
another’s places” so that he could dispense with symbols for relations) -- it was soon 
after this that Buckingham’s formalization is presented in London, which emphasized 
how the whole basis for scale modelling really follows from the general principle of 
dimensional homogeneity, that is, from looking at the most general form of an equation 
and paying attention only to the various possible combinations of different types of 
magnitudes that cannot be substituted in one another’s places.  And that paper did 
make an impact.  The next year Lord Rayleigh published an essay devoted to the 
subject, entitle “Physical Similarity”.  Rayleigh had been a proponent of the practice of 
physical similarity, often urging that its power was underappreciated, and he often 
lauded Reynolds’s work in essays on various subjects, but 1915 was the first time he 
devoted a whole essay to the topic.  Then there is an explosion of literature on the 
methods of physical similarity and of dimensional analysis in the next few years. 
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Let me go back to what Buckingham actually said; I’m just going to repeat it now, so 
you can notice that the emphasis is on SYMBOLS:  
". . . any equation which describes completely a relation subsisting 
among a number of physical quantities of an equal or smaller 
number of different kinds, is reducible to the form 
             ψ( π1, π2, π3, π4,  etc. ) = 0
in which all the ’'s are all the independent dimensionless products 
of the form Q1x, Q2y, . . ., etc. that can be made by using the 
symbols of all the quantities Q.  [Buckingham 1914, p.  376 ]
We don’t know details about the specific scientific papers Wittgenstein read, but we do 
know that this was a major advance -- to this day it is Buckingham’s Summer of 1914 
paper that is cited in English-language texts as the landmark paper that provides the 
formal mathematical basis for the method of scale models -- that  according to 
Wittgenstein's own account, it was subsequently reading about the use of an 
experimental scale model in the Fall of 1914 -- though in a courtroom!, rather than in a 
laboratory -- that stimulated him to think of a proposition as a picture. 
All right.  That’s the historical story.   What difference does it make to the philosophy? 
I promised that everything about objects, atomic facts, and propositions would fall into 
place once we understood this notion of model.  That’s all I’m going to claim:  that a 
coherent reading falls out of this understanding, not that it’s a good account of 
language.  But I’ll also hint at why I think it helps us see a thread between this early 
work and Wittgenstein’s later work. 
Let me return to the points in the Tractatus I mentioned early in the paper, and let’s 
look at them in the light of this view of model or picture as experimental model: 
- that a picture is a fact  [TLP 2.141] 
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[That’s easy:  a model is a fact in the world, in that it is that certain proportions or 
dimensionless parameters hold in a physical situation that makes it a model of 
something else]
- that a picture is a model of reality  [TLP 2.12], 
- that the "pictorial relationship" that makes a picture 
a picture is part of that picture  [TLP 2.1513]
This remark makes perfect sense:  A model isn’t a model all by itself, only insofar as 
we regard it as a model of some other situation, and in scale modelling, this means 
using what are called “modelling laws”.    A nice example of this is in model trains:  
time runs faster in a model than in the real situation.  This means frequency will be 
higher.  So the train whistle in the model will be high -- this can be disconcerting, until 
you have developed the experience such that you “hear” the corresponding note 
instead of the actual one.  That a model is a model of some other situation is perfectly 
clear to fluid modellers:  a lab setup using oil on a small-diameter pipe is used to 
model a whole family of situations:  monographs are provided showing how to apply 
the results to situations involving different fluids flowing in various sizes of pipes.  
- that a picture must have its pictorial form in common with 
reality in order to able to depict it  [TLP 2.17],   
I think it’s clear that  the reason it works is because it is also a piece of the world.  The 
facts are the dimensionless ratios that are the same between the model and the 
situation being modelled, so depicting is having the same dimensionless ratios.   It 
seems to me that the pictorial form would be having the same objects, i.e., the same 
quantities.  So, in the screw propellor problem, it doesn’t matter that we are using 
water in the model to picture a situation involving air, what does matter is that the 
relevant quantities are viscosity, temperature, velocity, and so on; something like that. 
And, when reading the sections in the Tractatus about objects and states of affairs, or 
atomic facts, such as: 
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- the statement that the form of an object is the possibility of its 
occurring in states of affairs, or atomic facts
If we see physical quantities as objects, and dimensionless parameters as atomic 
facts, Wittgenstein’s statement here seems to express exactly that the kind of quantity 
an object is [length] is determined by the way it can be combined with other quantities 
to yield dimensionless quantities.  This makes a lot of sense -- it’s not claiming that 
there are certain kinds of quantities that are basic (such as mass, length, time, etc.) but 
that the what’s important about the kind of quantity is how it combines with others to 
form dimensionless parameters.  In the degenerate case, if an object combines with 
some other object to form a dimensionless parameter, then they are of the same kind.   
He stays neutral as to which ones are basic or simple.  This is consistent with a later 
entry in his notebook, in the context of puzzling over which objects are simple and 
which are not:  he suddenly realizes this is not a question of which objects are 
absolutely simple:  he exclaims:  “The object is simple -- for me!”
- that in a state of affairs, or atomic fact, objects fit into one 
another like links of a chain, and 
- that if all the objects are given, then all possible states of 
affairs, or atomic facts, are also given.  
There’s a huge literature on what people call “the picture theory” in the Tractatus -- I 
mention here only one problem that some people think the most serious obstacle to 
making sense of it, and show it is no problem at all, but the most natural thing you’d 
want to say about picturing using models.   
OK.  Here’s the supposed obstacle:  If A can represent B and B can represent A, this is 
thought to be a problem for an interpretation of how A is a picture of B, for, the 
objection goes,  how do you know which is reality and which is the picture?  For 
people who think of Wittgenstein as proposing the picture theory to bridge a divide 
between two realms, one of which is reality and the other of which is some sort of 
representation of reality, this is supposed to be a knock-down argument for the 
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dismissal of the whole lot of attempts to make sense of how propositions could be 
pictures.  
Now let's think of this along lines of a scale model.  Both  are in the world.   What 
happens is that either the scale model does represent the situation or it doesn't.  Now 
how do we tell?  Well, we can ask whether or not the model behaves like the situation 
represented.  Both A and B are real;  the question is whether A pictures B, and the 
picture A includes the representing relationship.  In the courtroom, the model made a 
claim:  the situation was like this.  Then we use the model to investigate the 
consequences of the claim that the situation was like the model or picture:  for 
instance, in the picture, could the car have stopped at the stoplight and still have run 
into the person?  Was the improperly parked bus blocking the view of the pedestrian?  
And so on.
Now, for the model to represent the situation, it has to match it in terms of the 
consequences.  It's a picture if it does.  The question of which one is "correct" is a 
question one can ask only in the context of the claim that one of the situations is being 
claimed to be like the other.  They are both real, neither of them is outside the realm of 
reality or violates natural laws.  The question is whether or not the one you are  using 
as a proposition matches reality or not.  The model reaches right out to reality;  you can 
ask:  is the value of the quantity, such as elapsed time, that the picture projects (i.e., 
you have to apply the “modelling laws” that tell you, for instance, that one second in 
the model is ten seconds in the real traffic situation)  the same, are the geometric 
traces of the projectile the same, are the flowlines the same, and so on.  For a model to 
be a picture of something, one thing is relevant:  is the model the same with respect to 
some phenomenon or other as the thing the model is of?  Yes or No?  Yes for True, No 
for False.  
~~~
That’s the philosophical significance of the historical story. I have two speculations 
about the human side of things to add in closing:  
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First, given that I am emphasizing how ubiquitous scale models were in laboratories, 
then why is it the use of a scale model in the courtroom, rather than a laboratory, that 
kicks off the thought that a proposition portrays by being a picture.  Here's my  
speculation:  in  a courtroom, there are "statements of fact" and "statements of law".  
"Statements of fact" would include statements about how things happened, and what 
the consequences of certain actual and counterfactual events were or would be. 
"Statements of law" would include statements about responsibility and blame.  One 
can use the scale model only to establish statements of the first sort.  In fact, once all 
the questions of the sort that could be settled by a scale model are settled, questions 
about responsibility, blame, punishment, and regret, are still untouched.  In such a 
context, anyone who thought that empirical propositions might have anything to say 
about such questions should -- and often would --- be brought to realize that they 
don't.  In a law-court, someone following such a line of thought might be silenced by 
being told that the question they are attempting to provide evidence for to the jury is a 
question of law, not of fact. 
 Wittgenstein did say that the most important point of the Tractatus was an ethical one, 
and was made by what he didn't say.  Perhaps the point about ethics arose out of, or 
resonated when,  reflecting on the limits to what a scale model could portray about a 
situation in the context of a courtroom, rather than a laboratory.  He ended his preface 
to the Tractatus by saying that, if he was correct in believing that he had found the 
solution of the problems of logic, that this shows "how little is achieved when these 
problems are solved."  So perhaps it was the interest in exploring limits to what can be 
portrayed that set him to work on working out the idea that a proposition is a picture.
Second, I think the fact that he framed the question in terms of how a model is used in 
a foreign court of law, where there are rules about what counts as evidence, and 
conventions of courtroom procedure established by social institutions,  is a thread 
between his earlier and later work.  Once he makes the notebook entry about the dolls 
in law-court, he never stops thinking about a proposition being a picture.  It is in part in 
working out that idea all over again that the later work arises.  In his later work, social 
and cultural aspects of language become more important than they seem to be in the 
Tractatus, but I suggest this:  That he was first stirred to think about propositions this 
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way by a context that involves social institutions, responsibility, blame and punishment 
shows us that his personal interest in logic was never something apart from such 
concerns.  I can hardly think of a more culturally embedded, emotionally charged 
setting in which to think about  “the general concept of the proposition” and “the co-
ordination of proposition and situation”  than a dispute about who was in the right 
legally in a traffic accident!
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Wittgenstein & Physical Similarity 
ENGLAND 
Note: This chart does not show the contributions from 
Russia.  Moscow had wind tunnels in 1891, and 
Buckingham’s now-landmark 1914 paper is based on the 
work of a Russian mathematician.  
1883
Osborne Reynolds, Engineering Prof. at U. of 
Manchester, England, shows that onset of turbulence 
depends on a dimensionless number, not on velocity. 
1884 
Reynolds paper on “conditions of similarity under any 
geometrically similar circumstances” 
1899  
Lord Rayleigh’s paper in which he states that “the 
principle of dynamical similarity” is based on dimensional 
analysis.  Cites Reynolds’s work. 
1908 (Spring)
Wittgenstein arrives at Kite Flying Upper Atmosphere 
station Spring 1908. 
1908 (Autumn)
Wittgenstein at University of Manchester, studies 
aeronautical engineering.  Discussions with Lamb. 
1909 
Lord Rayleigh is made president of the 1st British Council 
of Aeronautics.   Rayleigh popularizer of principles of 
similarity. 
1911
Wittgenstein goes to Cambridge to study logic and 
foundations of mathematics with Bertrand Russell. 
1913 Autumn -1914 Spring
Wittgenstein  in Norway.  “Notes on Logic” (1913) 
“Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore” (1914)
1914 Summer 
Lord Buckingham presents “Physically Similar Systems: 
Illustrations of the Use of Dimensional Equations”
1915 
Lord Rayleigh “Principle of Similarity” (London)
Lord Buckingham “Model Experiments and the Forms of 
Empirical Equations (presented in America)
EUROPE
1873 
Helmholtz’s “On Geometrically Similar Motions of Fluid 
Bodies with an application to the steering of air balloons” 
uses dimensional analysis to establish the 
dimensionless ratios required to achieve physical 
similarity between two situations. (Berlin) 
 
1889-1906
Wittgenstein born in Vienna.  Educated at home until age 
14.  Then at Linz, Upper Austria.  
1906
Wittgenstein wants to go to Vienna to study physics with 
Ludwig Boltzmann. Boltzmann dies. 
1906 -1908
Wittgenstein attends Technical Hochschule to study 
engineering. (Berlin -Charlottenberg). 
 [? Highly probable: Wittgenstein purchases in Germany 
a German translation of Hydrodynamics, by Horace 
Lamb, who is a Professor of Mathematics at U. of 
Manchester. ] At end of program, decides to go to 
England for graduate research in aeronautical 
engineering.
1910 
Prandtl’s paper on importance of model experiments.  
1910 +
Propeller Turbine being developed in Munich. 
1914 
Prandtl explains that the drag coefficient of a body is a 
function of the dimensionless “Reynolds number”.
1914 Summer 
Wittgenstein volunteers for Austrian Army, WWI.
1914 Autumn
Wittgenstein reads about use of model in a Paris law-
court, gets insight that “in a proposition a world is put 
together experimentally” and that a proposition is a 
picture
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